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Abstract 
In thispa er, Klaw von Beyme discusses the causes and consequences uf the 
German un8cation process. in the frame uf transitions to democracy in ex- 
socialist Europe. Firstjy, he shows that classical models of democratic transition 
auailable in olitical science are not suitable for the German case, bein 
necessay to k a 1  with speczjc factors like cultural penetration uf the ~ederaT 
Republzc into the Denzocratic Republic, conditions or a transition were more 
favourable than in orhr socialzst regimes, and t d zs fact, at the same time, 
removed any possibility uf claimin a athird wayw to democratic socialism. 
FinalLy, the author goes on fi.om 6erman national context to international 
situation, analyzing upon wzch options world leaders gave at lastgreen light to 
unz$cation in its presentform. 
Resum 
En aquest article, Klaus von Beyme discuteix les causes i conse ütncies 
delprocés din;f;caciÓ aleman a, en el marc de la transició ca a la %mocrd- 
cia de 1Europa ex-socialista. ZnPrimer lloc, ens mostra que e e s models cldssics 
de transició democrdtica disponzbles en citncia política no són aplicables al 
cas alemany, i, per tant, la necessitat de tractar actors es ecí zcs com aya la 
penetració cultural de la República Federal en ; a Repúb zca emocr2tzca, o 
la qüestió nacional. En segon lloc, von Beyme argumenta que a causa dáques- 
ta especial situació de la República Democrdtzca, les condicions per a una 
transició democrdtica eren més favorables que en altres rt ims socialistes, i 
que, al mateix temps, a& allunyava qualsevolpossibilitat Apropu ar una 
((tercera viar de social~sme democrdtic. En darrer lloc, 1 ihtorpassa &context 
nacional alemany a la situació internacional, per analitzar quines o cions 
forma actual. 
e portaren els líders mundials a donar carta blanca a la unzficdció en a seva 
En este articulo, Khw von Byme discute b causas y consecuencias delpro- 
ceso de unzjcación alemana, en el marco de la transición hacia la democracia 
de la Europa ex-socialista. En primer lugar, muestra cómo 10s modelos clásicos 
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de transición democrútica diponibles en ciencia política no son aplicables al 
caso alemún, y ue es necesario watarfactores es ectjcos como son lapenetración 
cultural de la LKpÚblica Federal en la Repú t! lica Democrútica, o la cuestidn 
nacional. En se undo lugar, von Byme argumenta que, debido a esa especial 
situación de la $ública Democrútzca, i condiciones para una transiczón de- 
mocra'tica eran mús favorables que en otros re ímenes socialistas, y que, al mis- 
mo L m  o, ell0 alqaba cualquierposibilidaf depropu ar una ((tercera viar e r de socia ismo democrútico. Por Últzmo, el autorpasa de contexto nacional ale- 
mún a la situación internacional, para analizar quk opciones llevaron a 10s li- 
deres mundiales a dar carta blanca a la unificaczón en su firma actual. 
T o  analyse the German question in this transitory moment is risky in se- 
veral respects. The German novelist Martin Walser who undenvent a meta- 
morphosis from a fellow traveller of the Communists to a German nationalist 
put in bluntly: ((He who does not get bellow his intellectual level when talking 
about Germany has no intellectual level at all)). The topic has pitfalls every- 
where: 
- it is highly connected with emotions whatever the view of the writer, 
- it is in flux, ccwords are outdated in your mouth)) as a cynic put it. The in- 
creasing number of actors who claim to have a say in the German unifi- 
cation process makes prognosis almost impossible. 
- Scientific analysis of this unique event lacks concepts. Transition to demo- 
cracy in a highly penetrated system does not follow the established rules 
of this branch of knowledge. 
The transition to democracy in East Germany surprised the world in two 
respects as an event quite unexpected by experts: 
1) The sudden collapse of the socialist regimes was anticipated not even by 
experts. The insights of former research on transition to democracy proved 
not to be applicable to the new cases. 
2) Within this regime shift the East German case deviant in so far, as few had 
expected the rise of nationalism in Germany. Uriexpected too was the enor- 
mous speed in which all the major allies and former foes in Eastern Europe 
recognized the right of the Germans of self-determination on the question 
of unity. The only justified concern were the conditions for a new security 
system after the shakeup of the old one. 
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1 TRANSITION TO DEMlOCRACY 
In third world countries many scholars in the tradition of modernizdtion 
theo y developed a theoy ofjLnctionalprerequisites of democracy. A Hungarian 
ambassador recently mentioned in an international symposium that scholars 
in his country took it for granted that below the level of $ 6000 of gross do- 
mestic product per capita there were no chances to develop a stable democracy 
(Ende, 1989, p. 13). 
This conclusion is highly questionable because it ignores the proper poli- 
tical conditions, specially those within the European international system. 
The search for correlations between developmental stages and prospects of sta- 
ble democracy are even more problematic in the case of the socialist countries 
than under Third World conditions for severa1 reasons: 
- Communist regimes imposed equalization and social and political Gleichs- 
chaltung. Thus the social lheterogeneity and fragmentation is less developed 
than in developing countries. The ancien régime has, so to speak, created 
some prerequisites of democracy which are lacking in developing coun- 
tries. 
- Typologies of communist countries showed little correlation with the de- 
gree of repression in the respective country. The poorest country, Romania, 
and the richest countries; such as the GDR and Czechoslovakia were on 
top of the repression scale. 
- The degree of experience with democratic politics showed no correlation 
with development. Romania started only late, the GDR led the movement 
in its final stage. But th~e true forerunners were Poland and Hungary, 
countries in the middle of all developmental scales. Czechoslovakia started 
after the GDR, but than developed the ambition -as one of the rebelling 
students put it in front clf western cameras- to finish in one week what 
the GDR did in two months in order to enter the Guinness book of re- 
cords. 
It is noteworthy, however, that a whole group of countries, independent 
of its stage of development joined a peaceful revolution. Its foes in the spirit 
of the ancien régime spoke o,f a conservative revolution, in order to avoid the 
insult of a contre-revolution (Ende, 1989, p. 1). The main explanation is an 
international one: there were clear indicators that Moscow would not suppress 
the upheaval by renewing the Brezhnev doctrine. 
After the approach of functional prerequisites genetic and organizational 
explanations of democratization spread in the social sciences. Rustow (1970, 
p. 346) was one of the first to reintroduce more political variables against the 
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sociological and economic explanations. He ended up, however, with genetic 
sequences of stages in the tradition of Brinton's (~Anatomy of Revolution)). The 
explanation was highly individualized and hardly any general theoretical con- 
clusion was left. 
Recent approaches concentrating on actors and organizdtional theories seem 
to be more promising in explaining the peaceful revolutions of Eastern Eu- 
rope. 
The main actor, the masses, were too weak to explain the success. Why did 
the security forces with the exception of Romania give in so quickly? The for- 
mation of masses via peacefil training by churches (Poland, GDR, CSSR) and 
reenforcement of the actors via international W a n d  other organizational va- 
riables are important conditions of success, but they do not suEce to explain 
why the establishment did not fight more fiercely. 
Adam Przeworski (1 986, p. 50) listed four reasons to explain why cracks 
begin to appear in authoritarian regimes and liberalization becomes possible: 
- The authoritarian regime has realized the+nctional conditions that led to 
its establishment. 
- The regime has lost its legitimacy. 
- ConJlicts in the ruling bloc, particularly in the military led to an appeal to 
outside groups for support by some factions. 
- Foreign pressure to put on a democratic face leads to compromises. 
The four propositions can be tested in the case of the collapse of commu- 
nist regimes: 
1) Socialist countries have hardly a finction, as many military dictator- 
ships which were meant to prevent a state from drifting to the left (the case 
of Franco Spain), or a counterrevolution against socialist transformation such 
as in Chile. Only the collapse of the Greek colonels may be explained by this 
functional consideration. The GDR is a good deviant example: it had no tem- 
porary function but was founded for permanence. The nation was split to 
make possible a socialist state on German territory. The funcional argument 
must be reversed: as soon as the GDR gave up its bureaucratic socialism, it 
lost its function and raison d2tre. The slogan we are thepeople within a month 
was substituted by the motto we are onepeople. 
In the middle of the 1970s the author of this article still assumed that 
communism had a strong capacity for renewal of its ideology (von Beyme, 
1982, p. 445). Reforms under Khrushchev and the early Brezhnev era made 
this plausible. In the last 20 years, however, bourgeois systems have shown 
much more capacity to adapt certain socialist political instruments (welfare 
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policies, radical democratization, coherent planning), whereas socialist coun- 
tries petrified and proved unable to adopt the achievements ofwestern demo- 
cracy (legal state, pluralism, market forces). 
Only Gorbachev was able to organize such a development form above. Af- 
ter 5 years of half-hearted nieasures he carried out the decision to renounce 
the leading role of the party ,and to acknowledge a de facto multiparty system 
which exists already in some: republics. Gorbachev dated the loss of the lead 
of socialist ideology about 1973 when the oi1 crisis imposed radical changes 
in capitalist countries whereas socialist countries still exercized the mentality 
of ideological self-ringhtenousness. The GDR in her propaganda was more 
agressive and less capable of learning than most of the other regimes because 
of its shaky legitimacy in a divided nation. Every night the class enemy came 
to the living rooms of millions of GDR citizens, influences which the offical 
propaganda tried to counterbalance. This negative competition made the sys- 
tem still more uncapable of adapting to new needs. 
2) A second hypothesis is that authoritarian regimes collapse when they 
loose legitimacy. Modern democracy system are legitimized mainly by four 
principles which they developed in a rather uniform historical sequence: 
- legal state 
- national state 
- democratic state 
- welfare state. 
a) The legal state was the only institution except of the national state 
which was developed in most of the East European countries which never ex- 
perienced full democracy. The territory of the GDR was part of a German tra- 
dition to pay off demands of democracy with the minimal requirements of the 
legal state (Rechtsstaat), which still explains the legalism of the German poli- 
tical culture. 
Carter's campaign for emphasizing human rights was considered by many 
actors -even in the West-- as a kind of interference. But the process of the 
Helsinki conference which was considered in the first years a victory of Soviet 
diplomacy became an ideological boomerang. Increasingly the Soviet Union 
was accused for violating hurnan rights, increasingly oppositions claimed these 
rights. Especially in East Germany the violation of these rights was so visible 
because of the monstrosity ofthe wall. Though the GDR was milder in its re- 
pression than many other countries from Czechoslovakia down to Romania, 
the violation of rights was more severely felt because of permanent compari- 
sons with the Western part of Germany. 
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6) The national state principle was violated in two respects: many socialist 
countries had losses of territory to the Soviet Union (in the Hungarian case 
to other neighbours but because of Soviet interference). The Brezhnev doc- 
trine of limitedsovereignty, several times democstrated via armed interventions 
of the red army (GDR 1953, Hungary 1956, CSSR 1968) reminded the com- 
munist countries every day of the limits of national statehood under socialist 
conditions. 
The GDR was a special case of national underlegitimation. Kissinger iro- 
nically has called the Federal Republic an economy in search of higher pur- 
pose. For the GDR the bonmot could be reversed: the GDR had a high ideo- 
logical goa1 but was an underdeveloped economy (compared to West 
Germany, and its former standards). The Federal Republic clung to the idea 
of national unity under the notion of a cultural nation. The class nation which 
the GDR had launched into the international debate, contained reifcations 
of the objectivist dejnition, whereas the Western notion of a nation would rat- 
her aim at the subjective side of an eveyday-plebiscite. 
The West German economy ccin search of a higher goal)) continued to speak 
for the whole of Germany. Sometimes with grotesque consequences. Already 
the name of the German state -literally translated ((Federal Republic Ger- 
many)) does not make sense in most other languages. This may have a late re- 
ward: the most likely narne of a unified Germany DEUTSCHE BUNDES- 
REPUBLIK makes a difference only in German many other nations can keep 
the name they have used so far for the Western part of the country. The latent 
racism that the Federal Republic considered everybody of German tongue as 
a West German citizen, even in those parts of the former Empire which were 
considered as being lost for good is backfiring. This brought the Bonn regime 
into serious dificulties. When Gorbachev made possible the exodus of hun- 
dred thousands of German speaking Soviet citizens and encouraged his allies 
in Poland and elsewhere to do the same, the influx was hardly tolerable. Social 
unrest in the Federal Republic and the rise of the new right-wing extremists were 
a consequence. Bonn carne close to the latent desire to rebuild the wall from 
the other side, but it was prisoner of its ownpan-german constitutional mythology. 
No foreigner and hardly any German understood that the Karlsruhe Consti- 
tutional Court ruled in the case of the basic agreement with the GDR, in 1973 
(BVerfGE 36, 1/26) recognizing a second German state, that the border 
-though being the most impermeable building since the Chinese wall and 
certainly less permeable than even the limes the Romans built in Britain and 
Germany- was said to have a legal quality not different from the boundaries 
between West German Laender. 
All this would have been political mythology without importance had not 
the majority of the East Germans used West Germany as a reference culture. 
Transition to Dernocracy -or Anschluf3? 
Most of the prominent East German literature -which was, maybe the most 
unique and autonomous pralduct of the GDR in the last 40 years- was prin- 
ted in the Federal Republic. One of the major advantages of unification for 
German literature will be that it looses on both sides of the former iron cur- 
tain its excessive preoccupation with la querelle allemande and its human di- 
mension. If one reads Boll, ~Grass, Johnson or Walser to mention only some 
of the authors also known albroad, it becomes obvious that postwar German 
literature provincialized in a way similar to the captive nations of Eastern Eu- 
rope in the 19th century. There was a predominance of two topics: love they 
had and the nation they had not. I expect that German culture will return to 
its former cosmopolitism in the tradition of Goethe, Heine or Thomas Mann 
and this would be a welcome byproduct of the unification process. A nation 
like others has no longer to reflect its precarious situation. 
Not only the two German cultures remainded closely related. Churches, 
trade unions and many other social institutions were kept apart by force, but 
preserved their organizational similarity. The GDR did not develop a national 
consciousness of her own --in spite of so much propaganda about the class 
nation. The West Germans in their majority had an identity feeling of their 
own, and the younger generation showed little interest in the East. But the 
public opinion polls were frequently misinterpreted. West German was -af- 
ter Belgium, a bi-ethnic nation- the lowest low-scorer on all the scales of na- 
tional pride. Unti1 the late 1980s about two thirds of the West Germans 
thought that reunification was impossible. But also two thirds were in favour 
of national unity if it proved to be possible in the future (von Beyme, 1986). 
In the light of these paradoxes those who are afraid of a new German natio- 
nalism get some comfort. The Germans have not changed their opinion very 
much: Even now, in wave oif enthusiasm only two thirds of the Germans are 
firmly in favour of reunification. 
c) A democratic state was the most important aim which triggered the pe- 
aceful revolution of 1989. H[ow was it possible that East Germany led the fi- 
nal stage of the process in the Eastern bloc? One explanation is that the church 
functioned as a training ground for peaceful resistence. The Lutheran church 
has an old etatist tradition arid unlike Calvinist denominations hardly any re- 
volutionary traditions. The church trained people to peaceful resistence, but 
not to revolution. 
The SED establishment s,hortly after the turmoil blamed West German in- 
tefeerence for the revolution. This was hardly true in terms of direct support 
form the Bonn government. Interference occured in an indirect way, via TV. 
Western TVin the days of upheaval had a mobilizingfinction. The people was 
informed about the number of demonstrators last night and got news where 
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and when the next rally was to take place. This reenforcement encouraged the 
people in a country without revolutionary tradition. Look at the history of 
West European democracies such as Britain, France or Italy. Shakespearean 
dramas of killing kings everywhere. In the German Empire one hardly finds 
a case even in the middle ages. Germans needed encouragement for deviant 
political behaviour. Even in the West, Germans are normal in many respects 
of participation, but still show slightly less tolerance towards unconventional 
behaviour. 
The regulation of language in the GDR in turmoil shows how little inde- 
pendent revolutionary thinking was involved. The new events and institutions 
were called with West German names. The revolution was a Wende-the ex- 
pression for the change in government of 1982. When the Stdsiwas abolished 
something was to substitute it. They found no other word than the West Ger- 
man Verfa~sun~sschutz. Compared to the Soviet Union the revolution is pla- 
yed down. Gorbachev, however, emphasizes the revolution of perestroika in 
order to demonstrate continuity with Lenin's impetus after 1917. It does not 
prevent the perestroika leaders from accepting what a PCI-leader, Sergio Se- 
gre, recently advised to all communists: ((All of us should finally become re- 
visionists)) (Die Zeit, 29. Dec. 1989, p. 2, col. 5). The events of Leipzig are 
called a revolution sometimes by its adversaries. Jürgen Kuczynski, the nestor 
of SED loyalists in the social sciences, dubbed it a conservative revolution. He 
quoted Mam, but the more familiar connotation is a quasi-fascist tradition of 
thought in the Weimar Republic (ibidem, p. 1, col. 3). 
The breakdown of the authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe accor- 
ding to Schmitter (1986, Vol. 1, p. 5) was facilitated by the subserviant role 
of the milita y with the exception of Greece. This argument has explanatory 
value also in the case of East Europe. Subordination of the military was a dou- 
ble one: two the national communist party and the Red Army within its bloc. 
The Brezhnev doctrine, oddly enough, undermined socialism though it was 
meant to protect it. The military of most socialist states was used to rely on 
the leading role of the Red Army. Once Moscow made it clear that they 
would not interfere, defense collapsed very quickly. It is not by chance that 
Romania is the only deviant case. Romania has emphasized its role indepen- 
dent on Moscow for 20 years and did not take part in the suppression of the 
Prague spring. Romania therefore relied on her own internal security system. 
Ceausescus main mistake was, however, that he created a counter-army in the 
Securitate. This competition of two armies encouraged large parts of the mi- 
litary to join the opposition in a critica1 moment of the rebellion. 
Democratic traditions had older roots in the GDR than in other socialist 
countries. Czechoslovakia had been considered more democratic than Ger- 
many before the Second World War, but it is difficult to compare. Czechos- 
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lovakia was one of the main winners at the peace treaties in the suburbs of Pa- 
ris, whereas c(Versai1lesn was considered as blatant injustice in Germany which 
did not strengthen the new system of the victors, e.g. democracy. But even 
without any democratic tradition the East Germans would have seen how well 
the other Germany fared with democracy. Western propaganda emphasized 
that market economy and true democracy are closely interrelated, and since 
most GDR citizens preferred the former they were also ready to buy the latter. 
Democracy as the form of government of the more succeeding part of the 
country had more legitimaqr even in East Germany than the socialist demo- 
cracy as a disguise of party dictatorship. 
d) The welfdre state was the fourth concept to legitimize modern political 
systems when social conflicts aggravated in the 20th century. Socialist systems 
committed the error to pretend that the enshrine per se a social state and the- 
refore do not need a social policy. From this rule the GDR was, however, 
again a certain exception. Iri 1965 Ulbricht's daughter wrote the first book 
defending social policy. The two German states already in the Adenauer era 
behaved like communicating tubes. Adenauer tried to compensate national 
legitimation of his rump statle by promoting welfare in order to immunize the 
West Germans against comn~unism. The other side had to act in the same di- 
rection in order to prove that socialism is superior and to prevent that the 
mass exodus continues which weakened the GDR unti1 the construction of 
the Berlin wall in 196 1. 
This was probably the most solid part of the legitimacy of the GDR. Unti1 
recently many GDR citizens believed that the GDR had better achievements 
in the social sphere though they knew that the economy of the West was su- 
perior. 
3) The third reason for the breakdown of dictatorship is dissent among the 
elites in a time of eroding ideological zeal. This erosion was not as strong as 
in Franco Spain (von Beyme, 1971, pp. 123ff.). But in a moment of crisis it 
worked in the same direction~. Parts of the middle level cadres of the party and 
some Lord Mayors of big cities such as Leipzig and Dresden, were no longer 
willing to use force against n~ass demonstrations. Some politicians like Hans 
Modrow (who becarne prime minister) or Berghofer (who stayed Lord Mayor 
of Dresden in spite of leavirig the party) were able to win the confidence as 
individual politicians, not via the party. The first suspended his party mem- 
bership, the second gave it u~p altogether. 
The party as a whole missed its chance to reform itself. In Czechoslovakia 
event the old DuEek crew had little chance to play a major role. By senatorial 
courteoisy of President Havel DubEek was given the honorary but not very 
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important post of a ~arl iamentar~ chairman. Emigré intellectuals of Dubsk's 
former government such as Ota Sik or Zdenek Mlyna? returned to Prague 
and continued to ~reach their theories of a third road-socialism, but only few 
were ready to listen. The GDR had not even these uncompromised figures of 
former reform attempts. 
4) The explanation of the accelerated breakdown of the communist regi- 
mes is impossible without reference to internationalfactors. In Southern Eu- 
rope the three authoritarian systems wanted to join the European community. 
The GDR was already indirectly a member and it was a completelypenetrdted 
system. Western cultural and lifestyle hegemony in the young generation be- 
came evident. West Germans were sometimes worried by hundreds of poli- 
tical groups. They forgot the lesson that in Spain around 1977 existed more 
than 300 parties. In the first elections they were cut down to 6 relevant par- 
ties. This process of streamlining theparty system back to internationally rele- 
vant groups is accelerated in the GDR. Some parties, such as the SPD, ini- 
tially did not dare to call itself exactly the way the Western equivalent was 
named. But by the beginning of 1990 it became clear that only groups which 
got Western help and had West German equivalents had a chance. In the case 
of the liberals, Genscher and the party leader Lambsdorff, were pushing three 
groups to merge for a common liberal list. Under these conditions of a pene- 
trated system no third road had a chance. Not even in the sphere of the trade 
unions. The meta1 workers union in the West encouraged some loose talk on 
a future democratic socialism. What they actually did was training cadres for 
bargaining and striking. Trade unionism without politics and tough revindi- 
cation policies were on the agenda of common meetings not the foundation 
of a third road working class paradise in the East. Some of the Marxists may 
have remembered that Mam and Engels had always ridiculised dreams of a 
third road to Prussian socialism in the work of Rodbertus, Diihring or Wag- 
ner. Engels polemized against Rodbertus the ccmisjudged genius who sticks to 
his astonishing ignorance about everything happening outside Prussia)) 
(MEW, vol. 21, p. 176). 
Even the Green Party in East and West Germany has abandoned in the 
meantime dogmatic views about the necessity of two German states. Left-win- 
gers hailing the people's will had for quite a time some trouble to push a third 
road to socialism though the masses in the streer had transformed the slogan 
ccwe are thepeoplm into the slogan (cwe are onepeopb. The major effort of 
West Germany policy for the last 40 years was to be recognized as a nation 
like others. It is noteworthy that the majority in East Germany shares this fee- 
ling that Germany should never again pursue a Sonderweg a special road to 
any ideological goal. 
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These were the four mair~ reasons for the collapse of authoritarian rule. All 
of them apply in different weight also to the breakdown of authoritarian so- 
cialism. Kant, however, taught us ccwho offers too many reasons has no suffi- 
cient reason for explaining causality)). This applies to this type of typologicai 
descriptive anaiysis of most transition studies. Still more speculative tend to be 
those parts of the transition literature which guess about the stability of demo- 
cracy after the breakdown of authoritarianism. In the German case we are in 
a privileged position. The former GDR is about to slip into a newpaternalistic 
relationship in order to let all1 its problems be solved by some big brother. 
There is not the slightest soliddrity among the former'socialist countries- 
hélas: Competition for a good start is almost danvinistic, only tempered by 
the fact that some countries still reluctantly sit on COMECON boards and 
therefore have to recognize .what the others do. This is true in spite of loose 
confederation talks between Poland and Czechoslovakia, which are unlikely 
to be implemented, Slovaki,~ would become still more obsessive, and which 
-after all- does not make much sense in a Europe despatries to come. 
2. THE PROSPECTS OF TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY 
IN EAST GERrVlANY-A PSEUDOPROBLEM 
BECAUSE OF A PATERNALISTIC SOL UTION 
In the years to come Philippe Schmitter and others will not fai1 to spread 
the transition to democraq literature into Eastern Europe. The GDR might 
prove to be not a very rewartiing case, because under conditions of unity, but 
even in a case of continuing two German states, the GDR will develop as a 
highly developed penetrated system. 
Prospects for democracy are better in East Germany than in the other so- 
cialist systems for several reasons: 
1) The military might ]play an important role in Romania or Poland 
-certainly not in East Gerrr~any because of international supervision and res- 
trictions. 
2) The former communist parties had dzferent options in the process of 
transition. 
a) Only in the Soviet Union and to some extent in its most faithful ally, Bul- 
garia, the par9 initiated theprocess of liberalization fiom above. In Bulgaria 
-and in the long run maybe even in the Soviet Union, it failed, however, 
to keep this process completely under control. The roadfor a multiparty 
system is open in both countries. 
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In a second type the party was disbanded and reappeared as a socialdemo- 
cratic party as in Hungary and Poland. The Communist remained a splin- 
ter group, though most deputies and leading figures in both countries did 
not join the new party. The results of forthcoming elections might change 
this latent attentism, however. 
In a third type the party defends its positions and tries to recover lost 
ground. In Romania this led to new demonstrations. Suspicions arose that 
the Revolution was ccstolena. In Czechoslovakia the party remained com- 
paratively strong and lost only about 30% of its members. In the GDR the 
former SED tried to keep its positions -with little success so far because 
the dissatisfied masses, too weak for open resistance, have a unique instru- 
ment of blackmailing the old guard: they leave to the West and cause an 
increasing damage to the native economy. 
3) The development of the new market economies will determine thefdte of 
democracy in all the states. Only the GDR is doomed to success. West Ger- 
many already blackmailed the old elites and drives the GDR into a position 
in which it has to accept West German notions of democraq and market eco- 
nomy. The ccgnomes of Frankfurtn in these tactics are even more successful 
than the ccgiants of Bonns. The process is a strain on the self-esteem of East 
German elites. The nasty word of unconditional surrender is quoted time and 
again. But the final result will look similar to the nasty word, and the masses 
accept it because they do not trust any dream of a new socialism or a third 
road between Stalinism and the ccugly late capitalism of Borm)). 
The aáuptation of the economy will cause enormousproblems. The questions 
of the preservation of a big socialized sector and the maintenance of collecti- 
vized agriculture will cause serious conflicts. But the dreams of a third road 
to socialism (still maintained by the GDR left, the former SED, the Greens in 
both parts of the countries and left-wing trade unions such as the union of 
metal workers), have hardly any chance. Hundred thousands of West German 
citizens own houses and small property in the GDR, never legally confiscated. 
Millions of skilled people from the East in the service of West German en- 
terprises who buy firms, cooperate with others or form joint ventures. It is 
dreadful to see how Eastern representatives lose almost their dignity. But ca- 
pitalism precisely for being successful -will show irs most cruel sides. 
A third road to democratic socialism was ruined by the Brezhnev doctrine. 
Dubceks experiment spreading over the whole bloc 20 years ago, might have 
given these ideas a chance if implemented with the solidarity of all the former 
bureaucratic socialist countries. But it is naive to expecr thar .West German 
oapitalists will fund socialist experiments which do not even meet with appro- 
val of the majority of the GDR citizens. 
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There are better chances to respect a certain autonomy of the GDR in the 
politicalsphere. But even here prospects are dim. All of a sudden the new groups 
discover that they have been talked into alliances by West German party lea- 
ders and they soon will end up in a completely streamlinedparty system ccmade 
in West Germany,,. Some people hope for constitutent arsembly where a new 
German constitution will be worked out. But the tendency is growing to im- 
pose the Basic Law of the Federal Republic because many people on both sides 
are afraid that there is not much time for initiatives in the two Germanies be- 
cause of the restrictions in tlle international sphere. Hegel developed the hy- 
~othesis that history happens twice. Mam ironicall~ completed the statement 
the first time it happens as a tragedy the second time as a farce. When West 
Germany created the Basic I-aw the allied powers talked the constituent par- 
liamentarians i n t ~  undue haste and did not permit a popular approval of the 
new constitution. By radical democrats this was considered as a tragedy. The 
same now might happen as a farce. Again, our allies talk the Germans into un- 
due haste because they do not trust the stability of transition to dem oc rac^ in 
the Soviet Union. 
3. TRANSITION AND Anl'SCHL Uf 
IN THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
The GDR is a special case in the transition to democracy because the Ger- 
man question is too important to leave it to the Germans alone. 
The bipohr security systenz in Europe until now was characterized by a sim- 
ple rule: keep the Soviets out-keep the Germans down. The first goa1 seems to 
have been attained to an extent which was unthinkable until recently. The 
new thinkingis now concentrating on finding a solution for a united Germany 
which links Germany to the legitimate security interest of both East and West 
without leaving underdog feelings in Germany. 
Several options for settling the German problem are available: 
1) The veto against unificaition from outside. 
2) To release the two Gerrnan states into a unified neutrality. 
3) To keep Germany in thle NATO and find a solution for Soviet security 
needs. 
I) The veto against ~nifi~cation a d to keep up the status quo. 
Egon Krenz shortly befolre his downfall reminded the Germans of the fact. 
that nobody outside Germariy wanted reunification of the two German states. 
Indeed, there were plenty of hints that this was true also for the elites in the 
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West. Andreotti had caused a good dea1 of resentment in the early 1980s by 
a variation of the old Mauriac dictum that he loved Germany so much that he 
wanted to have two of them. The United States had always paid lip service to 
German unity -but it seemed to be easy to give comfort to German feelings 
without any obligation, because everybody agreed unti1 mid 1989 that the Ger- 
man problem was not on the agenda. Gorbachev has repeated this even at the 
end of the same year. As his predecessor Brezhnev he never excluded that the 
problem one day might enter the political agenda, but he referred to some va- 
gue historical future. Once he mentioned that nobody could tell what history 
will materialize in 100 years. The public opinion polls among the masses were 
more favorable to the issue. Latent patriotism among the other nations could 
hardly imagine that Germany could be excluded from the national revival in 
the rest of the world. 
When the German problem entered the political agenda -even to Ger- 
man surprise- most of the responsible leaders in East and West accepted the 
German desirefor national unit.. Shamir or Thatcher became quickiy isolated. 
Even ministers of their respective cabinets broke away from the former con- 
sensus. Even Andreotti changed his mind. Political science-like metereology, 
the other topic discussed by most people in the pubs- frequently does not 
predict butpostdicts. Social science has not anticipated the democratic revo- 
lution and has failed to predict the quickly developing consequences in Ger- 
many. How can we explain this rapid change in the verbal behaviour-if not 
in the attitades of the elites in East and West? There are five explanations: 
a) A sense offirness and equal rights for Germans, Poles or Armenians 
motivated the elites in East and West not to stick to the Mauriac type of sta- 
tement in favour of keeping up a permanent division of Germany. Among the 
wiser actors there were additional considerations: 
b) Preventing the rise of a new German right-wing extremism. As a French 
intellectual put it: ccevery generation in Europe gets the Germans it deserves)). 
This dictum is certainly not true of 1939. No generation deserved the outrage 
of chauvinist racism in Hitler's Nazi regime -not even the Germans them- 
selves. But the kernel of truth is that fair treatment of normal national aspi- 
rations is the best prevention against the rise of new irrational nationalism. 
c) More pragmatic and short-term was the consideration of the European 
responsibilityfor the GDR. It was agreed from the outset that the GDR should 
have privileged access to the European community. Keeping a democratic 
GDR as a seperate state would amount to bardensharing with the Federal Re- 
publicfor the social and economic adaption of East Germany to West Euro- 
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pean standards. In the long lrun it might also prove an advantage for the EEC 
members not to have a completely penetrated system of the GDR always vo- 
ting with the Federal Republic but increasing the weight of German votes. As 
soon as majori9 decisionswill prevail one Germany has advantages for the rest 
of the community. When the Bonn government will take the budding costs 
of unification as a pretext to neglect itsfinancial obligations in the European com- 
munity, the neighbours will probably not be too impressed by the German ar- 
guments: No doubt, the West German economy is burdened with billions of 
DM in the future. But as soon as the Bonn government tries to avoid addi- 
tional taxes or special burde~isharin~ levies (La~tenaus~leich) it apparently feels 
capable of making the deal profitable without major losses for the Western 
parts of t he country: 
- The minister of finance, Waigel, mentioned already that 40 billions ofsub-- 
sidies to the GDRwhich have been paid in the past will come to an end. Di- 
vision was almost as expensive as unification, especially because Bonn per- 
manently buyed good will in East Berlin for the benefit of West Berlin. 
- Large parts of the necessary infrastructure and economic investments will 
be paid by West German firms, and the tend to keep an eye on profits as 
well. Germany thus has good chances to avoid major breakdowns of the 
boom which are to be expected after 1993 when many Westeuropean 
firms will discover that they have overinvested in order to be prepared to 
a relentless competition on a European scale. 
- West German federalisnv and its horizontal burdensharing will impose 
hard losses to some Laerider in the West. But it is an excellent device to 
organize financial help in a fairly equitable and tolerable way over large 
spans of time. 
d) The balance ofpower originally pointed in the direction of keeping 
Germany divided. A ((fourth Reich)) caused misgivings. Shamir was afraid 
even of a new holocaust-to quote only the most excessive statement. Henry 
Kissinger was one of those pragmatic experts who changed his mind in a cou- 
ple of weeks. He warned in December 1989 not to create the German pro- 
blem by the excessive attempt to avoid it. He hinted to German history in the. 
light of vacuum theo y and reminded those who only recognize the tradition 
from Bismarck to Hitler that central Europe invited wars rather because Ger- 
many was too weak than too strong (FAZ, 14.02.1990, p. 16). Indeed, ifwe 
compare the wars in the tinle of Reformation, the 30 years war, the wars in 
the periods dominated by Louis XIV or Napoleon wars were quite frequently 
caused because Germany was too weak. Concentration on recent history of 
the 2nd and 3rd Reich overlooks that during long periods Germany was ri- 
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diculized in the international theory of state of being no state at all (Bodin) 
or a state ccmonstro similen (Pufendorff). The torchbearers of a raison dktat 
school of thought from Machiavelli to Boccalini looked at the Germans rather 
with pity: petty little communities with nice industrious people, fortunately 
so frequently drunk that nobody was able to try to abolish his neighbour's fre- 
edom. Surely this idyllic Germany is not imminent in the 21th century. But 
the risks of an economic giant remaining politically and in military matters 
a dwarf have to be considered. 
When the most eminent scholar in German history in the United States, 
Gordon Craig, was honoured at his 70th birthday, the president of Stanford 
University praised him as a man who made sense of German history though 
everybody agrees that German history does not make sense. There are, howe- 
ver, more experts who recognize that the onesided view from ccLuther to 
Hitler)) (and hopefully this will apply also to Russia with similar simplifica- 
tions such as ccfrom Bakunin to Lenin))) is no good guidance for settling se- 
curity problems in Europe. Craigs option in December 1989 for Germany 
was still a ccbig No)) and a ccsmall Ayz to unification (Zu grog fur Europa? 
1989, p. 183). 
The main problem for experts on Germany is, however, that Germany has 
20 million more inhabitants than the other bigger nations, though the Ger- 
mans on both sides of the former iron curtain did their best by the lowest 
birthrates in the whole world to shrink back to a size which entitles them to 
one national state. They tried to undo the consequences of accelerated growth 
which caused Germany to overtake France in population figures in the 19th 
century. In the light of coming social problems it is likely that the Germans 
will make further efforts in the same direction. But do they have to wait unti1 
a nation larger in size, such as Russia can be accepted as part of the European 
community? They would have to wait still quite a time. The loose talk about 
the ((European hous&) may apply to economic and military questions, but even 
Gorbachev faces reality that Europe in close integration for quite a time will 
not mean ccfiom Lisbon to Vladivostob, and not even De Gaulle's old vision 
c (fiom the Atlantic to the Urab, but c (fiom Brest to Bresa! 
e) Timetables of European unzjcation are in danger and cause a trade off 
between West European integration and German unification. In order to pre- 
vent Bonn from blocking the European integration concessions to German 
wishes in their national feelings had to be made. Mitterrand in one statement 
hinted to this predicament. Blamed for having made too many concessions 
to Kohl he said: (calors Monsieur Kohl est un patriote)). This was said with an 
undertone that Kohl as a personality for the first time became plausible to his 
French partner. Patriotism is an acceptable word to French ears. 
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The discussion of the reasons European elites had for changing their mind 
on the German question makes it unlikely that the veto-solution will be pur- 
sued unless Gorbachev is toppled by a coup. The prospects for this worst case 
scenario fortunately are dim, since Gorbachev in February 1990 diversified his 
political support by renouncing the leading position of the party and ushering 
into a multi-party system. A kind of Gaullist semi-presidentialsystem might be 
the solution for a president who does not want to disband the Communist 
party altogether as Hungary and Poland or the GDR, nor wants to be depen- 
dent exclusively on the party majority. When Gavril Popov led the demons- 
tration on the red square in February 1990 most of the speeches and the shou- 
ting of the masses amounted to ((Down the whole Central Committee -but 
Gorbachev can stay)). If Gorbachev listened carefully he will have discovered 
the advantages of this mixed solution for his own intentions. 
In a similar paradox Gorbachev seems to have discovered certain advantages 
in German unification. It will certainly be his scenario for the negociations to 
come to revive the ccspirit Rlapallo) without alienating the Western powers. 
2) Neutrality of a unifiecl German state was Gorbachev's first choice. But 
quickly Western observers discovered that the Soviet policies in this respect 
were not simply a continuation of Stalin's initiatives of 1952 . The cccommon 
house in Europes and the Soviet search of a security system overarching the 
former two blocs were serious. That is why neutrality -opposed by all Wes- 
tern and Eastern neighbours of Germany for good reasons (after all the Wei- 
mar Reichswehr was ((neutral)) and cooperated with the Red Army)- was no 
goal per se for Gorbachev's German policy. 
Neutrality meets with opposition in Germany. It was unaccepted by the 
Christian Democrats. The Siocial Democrats in Germany paid lip service to 
the NATO but in a recent paper they saw neutrality of Germany as a ((goa/ 
in the long run)). Only the Green party was firmly in favour of neutrality 
-and this aroused new suspicions by the rest of the actors in and outside the 
country. For the time being neutrality is the least likely development. 
3) Germany remains in the Western system but compromises are found for 
Soviet security interests. 
When Kohl came back from Moscow he celebrated himself as having got 
a free hand for unification. What are the conditions? asked every journalist 
in the interviews. No condition w a s  the answer. But there were hints to two 
main bodies to be consulted who might some up with conditions: 
- thefour victors over Nazi German, 
- and the Helsinki successioln conference to be held by fall 1990. 
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Genscher promoted the formula 2 (the German states) plus 4 (the victors): 
but without vae victis -e.g. gathering on German initiative and on German 
territory. The main minimal expectation will be that Germany solemnly de- 
clares that the borders of 1945 are sacrosanct. This was promised for the mo- 
ment after the GDR elections producing a legitimized government anyway. 
The border question is largely overrated in its importance. It will be hard 
to ask the necessary material sacrifices from the West German population. But 
hardly anybody (expect a few refugee organizations) have an interest East of 
the Oder-Neisse. These areas have always played a minor role. Quite a few 
prejudices continued to despise them as ccunderdeveloped)) and not cccomple- 
tely)) German. (Born in Silesia the present author can dare to mention what 
hardly any West German would say in public). In the cultural sphere the loss 
of Breslau and Konigsberg certainly weighs less than the loss of Wilno and 
Lvov in Polish culture. The areas have been populated and rebuilt by Poles. 
Which German would claim to be in favour of pushing the multicultural so- 
ciety in the direction to start with integrating millions of Poles. The Polish 
problem will be a strain on German budgets and a reserve for German exploi- 
tation anyway. You can push Germany as far to the West as possible -the 
Poles follow westbound as a huge army of migrant workers and this tendency 
will grow as soon as they border directly with an established hard-currency 
country. Moreover no serious politician can ask the restauration of the Polish 
corridor which by its very oddity as a solution might have provoked a war 
even in a case that not a Hitler was available to push the issue. Oddly enough, 
the main victor, Stalin, created a new corridor. If Lithouania in the long run 
breaks away from the Soviet Union. Gorbachev inherits the corridor which 
separates a Russian speaking part of former East Prussian from the Slavic te- 
rritory. Konigsberg's little revenge over Kaliningrad! 
For the time being there is only one problem with Poland Germany can- 
not settle. As a consequence of the most unequal treatment of the ccguest vic- 
tors)) -France on De Gaulle's impertinant insistance got in- the Poles ha- 
ving suffered much more than France were kept out -now, they are again 
excluded from the formula 2 plus 4. Some actors might be ready to give in 
-but they are afraid that every country involved would ask to be present and 
the victors end up with a conference even bigger than the Helsinki succession 
meeting. 
The United States assured Gorbachev that they would not onesidedly try 
to benefit from Soviet dilemmas at this moment. The new proposal to reduce 
the troops to about 195 O00 gives the United States an advantage. They be- 
nefit already moreover, quite substantially by getting the Soviet to abandon 
the corner stone of the Soviet system, the GDR. The claim to keep Germany 
in the Nato is close to unconditional surrender policies. Baker in February 
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1990 launched a new proposa1 to keep Germany in the NATO only as apo- 
litical member. In military matters even in the French solution is hardly accep- 
table to Moscow. Unfortunately recent riots in the Soviet Union prevented 
the leadership from offering a clear policy standpoint. It is touching to see 
how quickly the former ccnjet-foreign policyn transformed itself into the con- 
fusing picture of contradicting actors. In the morning Shevardnadze said only 
neutrality is a solution, in the evening Gorbachev hinted at more flexible op- 
tions! Unprofessional dilettantism and ccad-hocism)) of Soviet policies in this 
moment are a certain danger in domestic as well as in foreign policies. 
Genscher's compromise of membership in the NATO, but no Western 
troup in East Germany, is hi:ghly artificial. Soviet troups can stay in East Ger- 
many. I think only to invite certain parts also into West German territory 
would be a substantial offer from the Western side. 
Whatever solution will be the outcome, it is unlikely that the four victors 
will follow Margaret Thatcher's self-defeating concept that all the Helsinki- 
states have to agree to a solution, and that even little Malta should have a 
right to veto. The Helsinkigroup should have not a negativefinction to veto 
but rather the positivefinction to create new institutionsfor a European security 
system. 
The West European countries were puzzled by the acceleration of German 
unification which happened for two reasons: 
- The exodus of the GDRp~puhtion did not stop: unification seems to be the 
only solution to prevent the GDR from bleeding out. 
- The internationalsituation did not exclude the attempt to roll b a h  the de- 
velopment by Moscow policy planners. 
OddIy enough the Community started to push the rapid Anschluflsolu- 
tion via Art. 23 of the Basic Law in order to avoid the necessity of changes in 
the treaty of Rome. 
We should be aware of the fact that a similar acceleration is operating 
among the other Comecon countries. At the end of 1989 it was still feasable 
to envisage a loose confederation with newcomers such as Austria, the EFTA 
countries and the former Comecon states. By spring 1990 it became evident 
that the Community should not discriminate Austria which found its 
application in a condition worse than the former Moscow satellites, and that 
the Comecon countries accepted no solution without prospects for full 
membership at the earliest convenience. 
Western Europe is not completely prepared to cope with the exigencies of 
this new momentum of European integration from Brest to Brest -as 
Germany has not yet any c~onvincing plan for handling unification and its 
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enormous monetary costs but both Europe and Germany are forced to 
muddle through. Economic integration will be more costly by this undue haste: 
but political integration of Europe especially the formation of a common 
foreign policy, contrary to many fears will get easier by this great ((salto mortale 
integrativa)) in a period of diminishing East West tensions. 
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